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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PAUL HARRY PEDERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20030879-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of theft by 
receiving stolen property, a third degree felony. This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury 
about mental states that were not elements of the crime charged? 
Whether a trial court erred in refusing to give a requested 
jury instruction presents a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 927 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The statute governing theft by receiving stolen property 
provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, 
retains, or disposes of the property of 
another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, 
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in 
concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property 
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner 
of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of theft by receiving 
stolen property, a third degree felony (R. 3-4). A jury 
convicted him as charged (R. 59-61, 97). The court sentenced him 
to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, consecutive to 
other prison commitments (R. 135-36). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 137). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Anticipating the off-season for his tree service business, 
Nathan Haynes stored his stump grinder and trailer in the open 
parking lot of another business, chained to the front tire of a 
one-ton dump truck (R. 158: 81, 83-84).2 The grinder was 
distinctive in several aspects: the front box had been rewelded 
1
 The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 52, 999 P.2d 565. 
2
 The parties stipulated that the equipment was worth 
between $2000 and $4000 (R. 158: 102). 
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to the frame; the gas tank had been patched; and, most 
noticeably, a bright blue rope held a cutting guard up out of the 
way to permit the cutting wheel to trim more closely (Id. at 82-
83). 
Towards the end of November 2000, Nathan received a call 
from a friend, who had been talking to another tree service 
owner, Scott Van Dam (JEd. at 86) . Scott had been looking at a 
stump grinder for sale, and Nathan's friend thought it sounded a 
lot like Nathan's (Id. at 87). Accordingly, Nathan went to the 
parking lot to check on his grinder and trailer. Both were gone 
(Id^). 
Nathan got in touch with Scott Van Dam, who directed him to 
the general location of the grinder for sale (Id. at 88). As 
Nathan walked down a driveway looking for the grinder, he spotted 
his trailer out behind a garage. He immediately recognized it by 
modifications he had made to it (Id. at 89-91). Nathan did not 
see his grinder outside and could not see into the garage because 
the window was covered (Id. at 92). He went back to his truck 
and called the police (Id. at 93). 
Nathan had brought two friends, Chris and Tiffany, with him 
on this reconnaissance mission (Id. at 96).3 Chris approached 
the house adjacent to the garage and knocked on the door (Id. at 
3
 According to Tiffany, Nathan had little faith in the 
police or "in the whole system" (R. 158: 143). He feared the 
police might tip defendant off and prevent him from recovering 
his equipment (Id.). Hence, he took matters largely into his own 
hands. 
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110). Defendant, who had apparently been sleeping, groggily 
opened the door (Id. at 110, 121). When Chris inquired about the 
grinder for sale, defendant asked how Chris knew about it. 
Chris's response, that Scott Van Dam had told him, put defendant 
at ease, and he invited Chris inside (Id. at 111). 
Defendant closed the door and locked it (Id. at 112). 
Defendant told Chris he would show him the grinder and then left 
Chris alone while he went to get more fully dressed (Id.). 
Chris, frightened to be in the locked home of a suspicious 
stranger, unlocked the door and went outside, feigning a need to 
smoke (Id. at 112, 118). Defendant eventually emerged, and the 
two discussed a price for the grinder, beginning at $3000 and 
eventually working down to around $1000 (Id. at 113). Chris 
testified: 
He led me to believe that the stump grinder 
belonged to him. He said that he had been 
working for a couple of years and [the tree 
industry] wasn't doing really good. He 
wanted to sell it . . . He was selling the 
stump grinder, and he was in control of the 
price. 
Id. at 113. Chris later added, "[I]t was crystal clear that 
this stump grinder belonged to [defendant]" (Id. at 125). 
Somewhere between the front of the house and the garage, 
Tiffany joined Chris and defendant (Id. at 114) .4 Defendant led 
them over to the garage and unlocked and opened the door, 
4
 Defendant apparently became nervous and changed his story 
when Tiffany began asking him questions. He told her the stump 
grinder belonged to "a friend" (R. 158: 114, 126). 
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revealing the stump grinder inside (Id.). Both Chris and Tiffany 
immediately recognized it as Nathan's grinder (Id. at 115, 117, 
134) . 
At this juncture, police began to gather out by the street 
(Id. at 135). Defendant, whom Tiffany described as "antsy," 
hurried to close the garage door and suggested that Chris and 
Tiffany come back in an hour to consummate the sale (Id. at 135-
36, 141) . 
A police officer then approached and told defendant he would 
like to see the grinder and trailer for sale (Id. at 146). 
Defendant once again opened the garage door. The officer, after 
verifying ownership of the grinder and trailer, read defendant 
his Miranda rights (R. 159 at 147, 217). Thereafter, defendant 
told the officer that his friend Wade had asked him to store the 
equipment for him at his residence (R. 158 at 147). When 
defendant could not or would not supply any further information 
about "Wade," the officer arrested him for second degree felony 
theft (IcL_ at 148) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to 
instruct the jury on mental states that were not elements of the 
crime charged. Where no persuasive legal authority supports his 
contention, his argument fails. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ABOUT MENTAL 
STATES THAT WERE NOT ELEMENTS OF 
THE CRIME WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS 
CHARGED 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible 
error by refusing to give his requested jury instruction defining 
mental states that were not elements of the crime with which he 
was charged. Specifically, he urges as error the court's refusal 
to instruct the jury that if it found that defendant acted either 
recklessly or with criminal negligence, then it must find him not 
guilty of theft by receiving stolen property. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 12-13; R. 91-92 or addendum A (disputed jury instruction). 
For this proposition, defendant relies wholly on an unpublished 
memorandum decision, State v. Meyer, 2001 UT App 297.5 See 
addendum B. 
Defendant's reliance is misplaced. Meyer is an affirmative 
defense case, holding that a trial court must give a requested 
self-defense jury instruction whenever defendant has presented 
some reasonable evidentiary basis from which a jury could 
conclude that he acted in self-defense, even where he did not 
specifically so testify. Meyer, 2001 UT App 297. Defendant 
5
 Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides: "Unpublished decisions may also be cited, so long as 
all parties and the court are supplied with accurate copies at 
the time all such decisions are first cited." Utah R. App. P. 
30(f); accord Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 516, 44 P.3d 
734. Defendant has not complied with this rule. 
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seeks to apply the reasoning of Meyer to his own case by urging a 
more general rule that, in any case involving a dispute over jury 
instructions, the trial court must give a requested jury 
instruction as long as defendant has adduced some evidence 
relevant to the subject of the disputed instruction. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 14. Defendant offers no support - nor is there any -
for such a novel rule. 
The trial court properly recognized that such an instruction 
should not be given. In rejecting defendant's proposed 
instruction in favor of one that defined only the mental states 
necessary to convict of the crime charged, the court stated: "I 
believe that the instructions [as given] adequately address the 
elements, and that as presented [by defendant], the [proposed] 
instruction would tend to confuse rather than enlighten the jury" 
(R. 159: 266). 
The trial court's ruling is correct. Without question, "the 
jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal elements 
that it must find to convict of the crime charged, and the 
absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a matter of 
law." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991); accord 
State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). But nowhere does 
the law state that a court is obliged to instruct on elements or 
mental states that are not necessary to convict. Here, defendant 
does not dispute that the jury was properly instructed as to the 
culpable mental states applicable to the crime charged. Thus, 
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the jury knew that if defendant did not act intentionally or 
knowingly, it must acquit. Telling the jury that it must acquit 
if it found defendant acted with a mental state other than 
intentional or knowing added nothing to what the jury already 
understood it had to find. Indeed, as the trial court correctly 
observed, instructing the jury to consider mental states that 
were not relevant would be more likely to confuse the jury than 
enlighten it. Where defendant fails to cite any persuasive legal 
authority to support his contention that the court had a legal 
duty to instruct the jury on non-culpable mental states, his 
argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a third degree 
felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this // ' day of June, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ 
One of the elements of the crime of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property is 
that the State must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that the 
property had been stolen or that he believed that it probably had been stolen and 
that he intended to deprive the owner of the property thereof. 
You are instructed that in every crime or public offense, there must be a 
union or joint operation of the act and the actor's mental state. A person is only 
guilty of an offense when his conduct is prohibited by law and he acts with some 
kind of criminal intent, that is he acts intentionally or knowingly as the definition 
of the offense requires. 
A person engages in conduct "intentionally," or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct "knowingly," or "with knowledge," with 
respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts 
"knowingly," or "with knowledge," with respect to a result of his conduct when he 
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
Acting "intentionally" or "knowingly" is more than acting "recklessly" or 
with "criminal negligence." 
A person acts "recklessly" with respect to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
With "criminal negligence," a person acts with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will 
occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
If you find Paul Harry Pedersen acted "recklessly" or with "criminal 
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RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Tina Caywood MEYER, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000895-CA. 
Oct. 12,2001. 
Rosalie Reilly, Monticello, for appellant. 
Before JACKSON, BENCH, and ORME, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge. 
*1 Tina Caywood Meyer appeals her conviction of 
Assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999). Meyer argues only that the 
trial court erred by not giving a jury instruction on 
self-defense. [FN1] The State did not file a 
responsive brief nor challenge Meyer's assertions by 
letter, memorandum, or otherwise, nor in anyway 
suggest that Meyer is not entitled to relief. We 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
FN1. Self-defense can be asserted when 
the defendant "reasonably believe[d] that 
force [was] necessary to defend him[- or 
her]self or a third person against such 
other's imminent use of unlawful force." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1999). 
" 'Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a 
proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a 
question of law, which we review for correctness.' " 
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 31 P.3d 
557, 2001 UT 77, If 38, 429 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). We 
recently stated that " ' "[f]ailure to give requested 
jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if 
their omission tends to mislead the jury to the 
prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently 
or erroneously advises the jury on the law." ' " State 
v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, \ 17, 17 P.3d 1153 
(citation omitted). 
Here, Jenni Monteath testified that Meyer "grabbed 
[Monteath's] hair on both sides" and hit Monteath 
ten or twelve times with a closed fist. On the other 
hand, Meyer's husband testified that Monteath 
"came out and grabbed [Meyer] by the head." 
Meyer herself, testified that Monteath "pulled 
[Meyer] over into the side of the apartment" and 
began "scratching and clawing at [Meyer's] face." 
Meyer also testified that she never hit back and that 
her main "concern was pretty much just trying to get 
out of the situation." 
A jury instruction on self-defense must be given 
"when the defendant has presented sufficient 
evidence that [the defendant's] assertion of 
self-defense rises to a conscious level in the minds 
of jurors." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, If 8, 
18 P.3d 1123. "We are not concerned with the 
reasonableness, nor the credibility of the defendant's 
evidence relating to his [or her] claim of 
self-defense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 
(Utah 1980). We only decide whether "there is a 
basis in the evidence ... which would provide some 
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude" that 
Meyer acted in self-defense. State v. Knoll, 111 
P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985). 
While Meyer did not testify that she was acting in 
self-defense, she requested a jury instruction 
regarding self-defense. Further, although the 
testimony at trial conflicted, "there is a basis in the 
evidence ... which would provide some reasonable 
basis for the jury to conclude" that Meyer acted in 
self- defense. Id. Thus, we conclude that the 
evidence presented justifies an instruction on 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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self-defense. See Torres, 619 P.2d at 695. Omitting 
the jury instruction " ' "insufficiently ... advise[d] 
the jury on the law," » " Stringham, 17 P.3d 1153, 
2001 UT App 13 at <h 17 (citation omitted), 
because it did not allow the jury to consider 
alternate theories presented at trial. Accordingly, 
the trial court's refusal to give the self-defense 
instruction was reversible error. 
*2 The court stated that it refused to give the 
instruction because "self- defense [didn't] fit" with 
Meyer's testimony that any touching she did was 
incidental or accidental. The court agreed not to 
give the self-defense instruction if the prosecution 
would not argue that Meyer recklessly caused the 
injury because Meyer's statement that she just 
wanted to get out of the situation was "a valid 
defense too," and self-defense was inconsistent with 
Meyer's theory. However, Meyer also testified that 
(1) her "concern was pretty much to get out o f the 
situation; (2) she "had one hand in [Monteath's] 
hair, pulling [Monteath's] hair, because [Monteath] 
had her hand pulling" Meyer's hair; and (3) she put 
her "hand down on [Monteath's] forehead to push 
[her]self up." Further, both Meyer and Meyer's 
husband testified that Monteath was the aggressor. 
Thus, Meyer's testimony included assertions that 
she had used force to extract herself from a situation 
where Monteath was the aggressor. Although Meyer 
testified that any touching was incidental or 
accidental, other testimony on the record is 
consistent with self-defense. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
We concur: RUSSELL W. BENCH and 
GREGORY K. ORME, JJ. 
2001 WL 1205307 (Utah App.), 2001 UT App 297 
END OF DOCUMENT 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
